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I. INTRODUCTION
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that any person who is injured
in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the anti-
trust laws "shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained."1 The
current private enforcement model usually permits plaintiffs to recover
damages based upon the excessive prices charged to consumers.2 However,
economists see the real loss to society from an antitrust violation to be
the consumer welfare loss which results from reduced output.3 The au-
thors have been unable to locate any antitrust case which has permitted
recovery of damages for this consumer welfare loss. 4 This article addresses
the following issues: if consumer welfare loss is the true measure of the
damage to society from an antitrust violation, should it be included in a
damage recovery; if consumer welfare loss is recoverable, who is the
* David C. Hjelmfelt, Attorney, Fort Collins, Colorado; Assistant Attorney
General Regulation Section, 1983; Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, University
of Oklahoma 1969-1971; J.D., Duke University, 1965.
** Channing D. Strother, Member, Goldberg, Fieldman and Letham, Wash-
ington D.C.; J.D., University of Virginia, 1977.
1 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
2 HousE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF THE AN-
TITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY REPORT 20 (1984) [hereinafter Report].3Id.
4 In an unreported decision, the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California granted defendant's motion to exclude any reference before the jury
to damages based on the loss of consumer welfare. The court held that on the
facts before it, the proposed damage calculations were speculative. Additionally,
the court held that the plaintiff, which was not the ultimate consumer, had not
sustained the loss and therefore did not have standing to recover for it. City of
Vernon v. Southern California Edison Co., No. 83-8137 (C.D. Cal. May 23, 1989).
Cf. In Re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191, 200 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974) ("[Tlhe amount of the overcharge is not necessarily
the total amount of harm to plaintiffs. Purchasers may also have been damaged
by being forced to turn to substitute goods, or to discontinue purchasing the price-
fixed product.").
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proper party to recover for the loss; and what difficulties are there in
measuring such a loss for purposes of awarding damages?
Consumer welfare is the value to consumers of a good above the price
paid for it. This value exists because consumers collectively would be
willing to pay more than the market price for every unit of a good pur-
chased except the last unit. The graph appearing in Figure 1 illustrates
these concepts.
$ Figure 1
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In a competitive market, the price is found on the price axis at the
point at which the supply and demand curves intersect. At that point,
the marginal cost of producing a unit of the good equals the price the
consumer is willing to pay for a unit of the good. In Figure 1, QC is the
quantity sold at price that would be established in a competitive market.
It is readily apparent that if supply were restricted so that the quantity
offered were any amount less than QC, consumers would be willing to
pay a price greater than the competitive market price because the demand
curve at any such quantity in Figure 1 is necessarily above the compet-
itive market price. The areas in Figure 1 denoted CW, T, and DW rep-
resent the monetary amount purchasers would be willing to pay but do
not have to pay if the price is established by a competitive market. This
area represents the consumer surplus.5
However, if the market is subject to a monopoly price, shown as PM,
the quantity purchased drops to QM. The box in Figure 1 designated T
is the amount of consumer surplus that is transferred from consumers to
the monopolist as a result of the monopoly price. It is this amount that
is generally recovered as overcharge damages by successful antitrust
plaintiffs. The area CW is the amount of consumer surplus that remains
even with monopoly pricing. DW is the area of interest for present pur-
l Melanie W. Havens, Michael F. Koehn & Michael A. Williams, Consumer
Welfare Loss: The Unawarded Damages in Antitrust Suits, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV.
457, 459-60 (1990) [hereinafter Havens].
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poses. This area represents the consumer surplus that is lost because
consumers are unwilling to pay the monopoly price for a certain quantity
of goods, but would have paid the competitive market price for that quan-
tity.6 Economists refer to this loss of consumer surplus, which is a loss of
consumer welfare or benefit, as a "deadweight" loss. 7 The loss is dead-
weight because it is a pure loss to society as a whole and is not a transfer
of wealth from the consumers to the monopolist. Deadweight losses result
from inefficiencies in the market that cause wealth or societal benefit not
to be created in the first instance. Therefore, total societal wealth is not
maximized. Rather, there is a misallocation of resources.
As previously noted, although the courts have not recognized dead-
weight loss as an element of antitrust damages, economists view dead-
weight loss to be the major harm of monopolistic acts to society because
such harm reflects a misallocation of resources. 8 Conversely, the transfer
of wealth generally used to measure antitrust damages is not considered
a harm to society overall by most economists.9 Accordingly, the current
measure of antitrust damages which calculates damages in terms of meas-
ures of excessive prices or overcharges does not address the real harm
caused by monopolies. 10
Moreover, even treble damages may actually fail to fully compensate
antitrust victims for the amount of their actual damages." One mathe-
matical model predicts that, at commonly encountered inflation rates,
treble damages provide insufficient deterrence even if detection and suc-
cessful prosecution is assumed to be certain.
2
On the other hand, a system which permitted recovery of only the
deadweight consumer welfare loss would also be inadequate. As noted by
Judge Posner in a class action suit by consumers injured by monopoly
pricing, limiting recovery to the deadweight loss would be insufficient
since such loss would only account for the damage to those who stopped
purchasing due to the monopoly price. 13 Such a limitation on recovery
6Id.
I Id. at 458 n. 6 (citing R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW; AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
237-43 (1976)).
8Report, supra note 2, at 20; Ball Memorial Hosp. v. Mutual Hosp. Ins., 784
F.2d 1325, 1334 (7th Cir. 1986) (injury from lower output is one of the principal
vices proscribed by the antitrust laws).
' Report, supra note 2, at 20. Wealth transfers are not deemed to be a loss to
society because the well-being of the buyer is not accorded a value greater than
the well-being of the monopolist. Thus the welfare transfer effect is societally
neutral because society as a whole retains the same total amount of wealth. Id.
However, Judge Posner has argued that the dollar value of the wealth transfer
may equate to a societal loss because firms expend resources in the rivalry to
become a monopolist and those resources are clearly lost to society as a whole
and are misallocated. Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Reg-
ulation, 83 J. POL. & EcoN. 807 (1975).
,0 Report, supra note 2, at 20.
,1 ABA ANTITRUST SECTION MONOGRAPH No. 13, Treble-Damages Remedy,
46-47 (1986) [hereinafter Monograph].
12 Id. at 43.
'3 RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW 293. See also Steven
C. Salop & Lawrence J. White, Treble Damages Reform: Implications of the
Georgetown Project, 55 ANTITRUST L.J. 73, 87 (1986).
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would fail to account for the loss to consumers who continue purchasing
at the monopoly price. Obviously, those consumers would experience
greater consumer welfare at the lower competitive market price. More-
over, sufficient deterrence is not provided by this limitation if potential
gains to a monopolist through wealth transfers exceed the dollar value
of inefficiencies caused by such monopolistic behavior. However, if anti-
trust remedies are to be limited to total economic inefficiency, the allo-
cative inefficiencies relating to acquisition of monopoly power noted by
Posner14 should also be a part of those damages.
II. THE PURPOSE OF ANTITRUST DAMAGES
The statutory provisions for the award of antitrust damages were en-
acted to accomplish several objectives. Among them are punishment of
the violator, deterrence of misconduct, and compensation of victims of
anticompetitive acts. 5 Determining the purpose of antitrust damages is
complicated by the trebling provision. Some argue that because such
damages are trebled, antitrust damages are primarily punitive. However,
there is no clear judicial analysis identifying the treble damages portion
of an antitrust damage award to be primarily punitive rather than com-
pensatory.16
Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the purpose of the trebling
provision is intentionally a mixed one.' 7 In addition to penalizing and
deterring wrongdoers, other purposes of treble damages include compen-
sating plaintiffs for the difficulty of bringing successful private actions,
encouraging enforcement of the law, and assuring proper compensation
for losses incurred as a result of an antitrust injury. 8 Congress had an
"expansive remedial purpose" in enacting the treble damage provision
and sought to create a private enforcement system that would deter vi-
olators and deprive them of the fruits of their illegal actions, while at
the same time providing adequate compensation to the victims of anti-
trust violations. 19
"1 See supra note 9.
Is Report, supra note 2, at 1; Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746
(1977) "§ 4 has another purpose in addition to deterring violators and depriving
them of the 'fruits of their illegality,' it is also designed to compensate victims of
antitrust violations for their injuries." Id. (citation omitted).
16 Ethicon, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 737 F. Supp. 1320 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
17 American Soc. of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp., 456 U.S.
556, 575-76 (1982).
"I Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 486 (1977). "Tre-
ble damages 'make the remedy meaningful by counterbalancing' the difficulty of
maintaining a private suit under the antitrust laws." American Society of Me-
chanical Engineers, at 575 (citation omitted).
"9 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
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Economists offer an alternative justification for the trebling provision.
They generally agree that the optimal measure of antitrust damages
should equal the cost imposed by the illegal conduct on society multiplied
by a factor which will account for the less than 100 percent risk of de-
tection and prosecution. 20 As previously noted, for economists, the cost to
society includes the deadweight consumer welfare loss. Deadweight loss
is a loss of allocative efficiency. "For those who believe that efficiency is
the exclusive goal of the antitrust laws, the wealth transfer is not a policy
problem, for it represents no efficiency loss. For them, the antitrust prob-
lem is the deadweight loss triangle.
21
There is no basis for assuming that recovery of the deadweight loss is
subsumed within treble damages. As indicated previously, while trebling
of damages is intended to accomplish several purposes, recovery of dead-
weight consumer welfare loss is not one of them. On the other hand,
recovery of deadweight loss fits the economists' ideal that trebled damages
should equal, at a minimum, societal costs. Recovery for deadweight loss
is fully consistent with the statutory purpose of antitrust damages of
assuring proper compensation for losses incurred 22 and would help to
achieve Congress' "expansive remedial purpose" in enacting the treble
damage provision.
23
It has been argued that popular support for the antitrust laws would
evaporate if consumers did not perceive a benefit from their enforcement.
24
Yet, a refusal to permit the recapture of lost consumer surplus by those
consumers forced out of the market by monopoly pricing denies would-
be consumers the benefits of antitrust enforcement. 21 Moreover, public
policy dictates a heavy reliance on private litigants to act as private
attorney generals to enforce the antitrust laws.26 If private attorney gen-
erals are denied the right to recover the deadweight loss, they have no
incentive to vindicate the rights of consumers frozen out of the market.
20 Report, supra note 2 at 2. Of course, no one knows what is the precise risk
of detection multiplier. Clearly it will vary depending upon the nature of the
violation and the factual context. For example, the risk of detection of a publicly
announced merger is probably zero, while the appropriate factor for a bid rigging
or price fixing violation may be much greater than three.
21 Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrusts Protected Class, 88 MICH. L. REv. 1, 14 (1989)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp].
22 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477 (1977). There is a
contrary view that an antitrust defendant should not be charged with damages
that may have flowed from the illegal act, but did not, however, profit the de-
fendant. See Mid-West Paper Products Co. v. Continental Group, 596 F.2d 573
(3rd Cir. 1979); Cf. In re Beef Industry Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d 1148 (5th
Cir. 1979) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905 (1980); In re Uranium Antitrust Litigation,
552 F. Supp. 518 (N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Bristol Bay, Alaska, Salmon Fishery
Antitrust, 530 F. Supp. 36 (W.D. Wash. 1981).
23 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 472 (1982).
-Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1020, 1035 (1987).
Havens, supra note 5, at 461.
-Id. at 461-62.
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While achieving optimal antitrust deterrence requires fines or damages
which include recovery for deadweight loss,2" a recovery of only dead-
weight loss would have an insufficient deterrent effect because the mo-
nopolist would profit from the wealth transfer.2 Since, as illustrated in
Figure 1, the wealth transfer is approximately twice the amount of the
deadweight loss, without a very high threat of detection, treble damages
based on deadweight loss would not deter violators.
Thus, recovery for deadweight loss alone would not be sufficient. One
cannot conclude that the Supreme Court has adopted the Chicago school
concept of allocative efficiency as the sole standard in antitrust cases.2
The Supreme Court has recognized that the proper antitrust outcome
may not reflect the optimum efficiency:
[W]e cannot fail to recognize Congress' desire to promote com-
petition through the protection of viable, small, locally owned
businesses. Congress anticipated that occasional higher costs
and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented
industries and markets. It resolved these competing consid-
erations in favor of decentralization. 3o
III. CAN DAMAGES FOR CONSUMER WELFARE Loss
BE REASONABLY CALCULATED?
One argument raised against permitting recovery for consumer welfare
loss is the difficulty of calculating the magnitude of the loss. 31 However,
commentators have argued that calculating consumer welfare loss is no
more difficult than many other routinely-made damage calculations.32
They argue that the consumer welfare loss calculation requires only de-
termining the just and fair market price and estimating the demand
elasticity. 3 Courts routinely estimate the just and fair market price in
calculating damages based on a monopoly overcharge 4 and have recog-
27 William M. Landes, Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations, 50 U. CHI.
L. REV. 652 (1983).
28 Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 6.
" William H. Page, The Chicago School and the Evolution of Antitrust: Char-
acterization, Antitrust Injury and Evidentiary Sufficiency, 75 VA. L. REV. 1221(1989); Eleanor M. Fox, The Modernization of Antitrust, a New Equilibrium, 66
CORNELL L. REV. 1140, 1153 (1981) ("Rather than standing for efficiency, the
American antitrust laws stand against private power").
31 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
-1 See, for example, supra note 4. 2 PHILIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 190 n. 22 (1978); Gregory Werden & Marius Schwartz, Illinois
Brick and the Deterrence of Antitrust Violations An Economic Analysis, 35 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 629, 632 n. 18 (1984).
32 Havens, supra note 5, at 462-63.
3 Id.
ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, Antitrust Law Developments 409-11 (2d ed. 1984).
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nized a number of methods which are acceptable for determining a just
and fair market price A5 It is even permissible for experts to study pricing
data during the critical period and then calculate the prices that would
have prevailed in a competitive market.3 6
The other factor needed to calculate the consumer welfare loss is an
estimate of demand elasticityY For this factor, a "before and after" ap-
proach may be used if a competitive market price was observed prior to
a period of monopoly or collusive pricing. In those circumstances, the
quantity demanded at the "before price" is readily ascertainable and the
price elasticity is easily calculatedY. s Where there is no "before" period,
the demand elasticity must be calculated statistically.39 Other potential
sources of demand elasticity figures are elasticity studies which may have
been performed previously by defendants for marketing or corporate plan-
ning purposes, which may be obtained through discovery. In Zenith v.
Hazeltine Research,40 the U.S. Supreme Court undertook the difficult task
of determining how large the plaintiffs percentage share of the markets
would have been absent the defendant's anticompetitive acts.41 Based
upon that determination, lost profits would be calculated. Calculations
for market share growth obviously involved many more assumptions than
does estimating demand elasticity.
- The "before and after" theory determines the just and fair market price by
reference to the price paid prior to the violation. The "yardstick theory" compares
the prices charged for a similar product in a similar, but competitive, market
with the prices charged by the defendant. JULANE 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 115.04[3] (1988). The "before and after" method
should not be used when the before-period is a period in which demand was inflated
by predatory pricing and the after-period is a period of monopoly pricing in order
to recoup profits lost through earlier predatory pricing.
36 Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509 (10th Cir.
1984), affd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Greene v. Foods Corp., 517 F.2d 635 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 942 (1976) (court permitted recovery for lost profits
for the wrongful termination of a distributorship when the expert witness for the
plaintiff had made an extensive examination of the plaintiffs financial records
and analyzed statistics about the general economic climate in the relevant area,
and had made an estimate which, though imprecise, was found reasonable).
37 Havens, supra note 5, at 463. There is not complete agreement regarding
the ease of determining demand elasticities. For a contrary view see William M.
Landes & Richard A. Posner, Should Antitrust Purchasers Have Standing To Sue
Under The Antitrust Laws? An Economic Analysis Of the Rule Of Illinois Brick,
46 U. CHi. L. REV. 602, 619-20 (1979); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Pur-
chaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103 HARv. L. REV. 1717 (1990).
38 Havens, supra note 5, at 463.
39 Id. Professor Salop agrees that the consumer welfare loss can be readily
calculated. A Reassessment of Antitrust Remedies; Panel Discussion, 55 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 123, 126-27 (1986). Judge Easterbrook, on the other hand, suggests
that it will be difficult in litigation to identify the lost demand. However, under
a strict simplifying assumption, the consumer welfare loss is equal to one-half of
the overcharge. Id. at 126. See also David Sheffmen & Pablo T. Spiller, Geographic
Market Definition Under U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, 30 J. LAw &
ECON. 123 (1987) (use of residual demand elasticities in merger analysis).
- 395 U.S. 100 (1969). See also Rangen Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons, Inc.,
351 F.2d 851, 855-56 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966) (award of
lost profits for lost sales due to anticompetitive acts upheld).
41395 U.S. at 116 n. 11.
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Elasticity studies are frequently used and relied upon by the courts for
other purposes. In Shannon v. Crowley,42 the plaintiffs were criticized by
a federal district court in California for their failure to account for demand
elasticities in their damage study. The Ninth Circuit has likewise indi-
cated that the failure to provide evidence of price elasticity for demand
prevented the plaintiffs from establishing damages. 41 Administrative
agencies utilize elasticity estimates for many purposes in litigated pro-
ceedings involving electric utilities, particularly in rate proceedings."
Setting utility rates to recover costs is analogous to calculating damages
to recover losses. Since elasticity estimates are used to set financial re-
coveries by utilities through rates, there seems to be no justification for
refusing to recognize them for the calculation of damages. Elasticity stud-
ies can be buttressed by sampling techniques in which individual cus-
tomers are questioned to determine their demand elasticity.
So long as reasonable estimates of demand elasticity can be made, there
is no reason to deny recovery of consumer welfare loss as too speculative.
An antitrust damage award may be based upon a reasonable estimate
even if the result is an approximation. 45 A plaintiff need only put forth
the "best available evidence." The defendant must bear the risk of un-
certainty and imprecision in computing damages.46
Professor Sullivan argues that the "essential thing is that the available
data be used in rational ways which warrant confidence that the damage
figure reached is, in fact, a reasonable if imprecise estimate, rather than
a speculative guess." 47 An antitrust plaintiff, who has been excluded from
the relevant market by anticompetitive activity, is entitled to recover his
lost profits.48 Surely such a lost profits calculation is no more precise than
42 538 F. Supp. 476, 480-81 (N.D. Cal. 1981).
4'Dunn v. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 735 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1984).
- Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp., 76 Pub. Util. Rep. 4th 530, 567-68(N.Y.P.U.C. 1986) (revenue forecast adjusted to reflect greater sales due to lower
rates resulting from lower oil costs).
JULIANE 0. VON KALiNOwSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 115.03[2][b] (1988).
a Id.
47 LAWRENCE A. SULLIVAN, HAND3OOK OF TIIE LAW OF ANTRrusT (1977).
Dolphin Tours, Inc. v. Pacifico Creative Service Inc., 773 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir.
1985); Pierce v. Ramsey Winch Co., 753 F.2d 416 {5th Cir. 1985) is a resale price
maintenance case in which the terminated distributor began selling another
brand of winches. Damages were awarded for lost profits based on the differences
between the number of substitute winches that were sold and the number of
Ramsey winches that would have been sold.; Lehrman v. Gulf Oil Corp., 500 F.2d
659, 663-64 (5th Cir. 1974) cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975); Montreal Trading
Ltd. v. Amax Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001(1982). (A prior purchaser who ceased to purchase from cartel could recover lost
profits but prior non-purchaser who claimed to be a would-be cartel purchaser
could not recover because damages were too speculative.).
[Vol. 39:505
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a calculation of consumer welfare loss. In determining the lost profit
damage award to the excluded plaintiff, the jury is allowed to act on
probable, inferential proof in determining the amount of damages even
though such an award is an approximation. The defendant, whose conduct
operates to exclude others from the relevant market, should not benefit
because its wrongful actions make it more difficult for the plaintiff to
establish the precise amount of its injury.49 It is sometimes necessary to
admit proof of damages bordering on the speculative in order to implement
the policies of the antitrust laws. This is especially true when the acts of
the defendant make a precise damage calculation impossible. 50 A lost
profit calculation will be accepted if it is estimated in any reasonable
way, and the underlying assumptions are not without support in the
record.51 The Supreme Court has said:
[W]hile the damages may not be determined by mere specu-
lation or guess, it will be enough if the evidence shows the
extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable in-
ference, although the results be only approximate. The wrong-
doer is not entitled to complain that they cannot be measured
with the exactness and precision that would be possible if the
case, which he alone is responsible for making, were other-
wise.52
Figure 2 also demonstrates that deadweight loss can be calculated. It
is similar to Figure 1, but adds a level of wholesaler to the vertical chain
of distribution, and assumes that the monopoly price has been imposed
by the producer on the wholesaler. For simplicity, it has been assumed
that the wholesale purchaser is able to match his purchase quantity
exactly with his retail sale quantity. It also is assumed that there is a
direct pass through of the monopoly price. It can readily be observed that
the wholesale purchaser suffers a deadweight loss in similar amount to
the deadweight loss suffered by the nonpurchasing consumer.
In a suit by the wholesale purchaser for lost profits, the wholesaler
would be allowed to recover, inter alia, the amount represented in Figure
2 by the rectangle BCEF upon proper proof of the quantity which would
49 Id.
50 Hobart Bros. Co. v. Malcolm T. Gilliland, Inc., 471 F.2d 894 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 412 U.S. 923 (1973).
51 King & King Enterprises v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657 F.2d 1147, 1158(10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Park v. El Paso Board of
Realtors, 764 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1102 (1986) (evidence
must show a rational basis for each assumption in damage study); Handgards v.
Ethicon, Inc., 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1190 (1985)
(plaintiff must provide evidence to support a just and reasonable estimate of
damages); International Distribution Centers v. Walsh Trucking Co., 618 F. Supp.
98 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
12 Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931).
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have been sold but for the anticompetitive acts."3 This includes the whole-
sale deadweight loss. Calculating the amount the wholesaler would have
sold under competitive pricing should not be any easier than calculating
the amount consumers would have purchased. This provides additional
support for the position that the consumer deadweight loss can be cal-
culated. Indeed, if the simplifying assumptions used in Figure 2 approx-
imate market realities, the calculation of the additional quantity which
the wholesaler would have purchased is also the quantity to be utilized
for calculating consumer deadweight loss.
There is nothing inherently speculative about the computation of dam-
ages based on deadweight loss. If the calculation is carefully performed
with adequate record support for its assumptions, such a damage study
should not be rejected on grounds that damages cannot be calculated.
Questions remain, however, as to when deadweight loss damages should
be awarded and, if so, who is a proper party to recover them.
In the situation represented by Figure 2, only the wholesale purchaser,
the direct purchaser from the monopolist, would be permitted to recover
damages.5 4 Should the wholesale purchaser be allowed to recover both
the lost profit on lost sales plus the consumer deadweight loss? The injury
to society represented by consumer deadweight loss is the misallocation
of resources.5 5 The misallocation of resources is derived from the fact that
too few items are produced and sold. When the wholesale purchaser re-
covers lost profits for items not sold, the damages already reflect the
proper allocation of resources. Nevertheless, even after the wholesale
purchaser had recovered lost profits under an assumption of allocative
efficiency, there remains a deadweight loss to consumers which is unre-
covered. If the direct purchaser is not allowed to recover for the consumer
deadweight loss, a portion of the injury caused by the anticompetitive
acts cannot be recovered by anyone.
Figure 2
deadweight loss
Retail at retail due toMono .0 wholesale monopoly
Competetve
Retai
Prce C deadweight loss
Monopo, E at wholesale due towhiaesalc monopoly
Wholesale
Pnce
Monopoly Compeilve Wholesale Read
Ouan.ity Wholesale Demnand DemtandQuantity
1 Illinois ex rel. Hartigan v. Panhandle Eastern Pipeline Co., 852 F.2d 891,
896 (7th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 986 (1988); Arnott v. AmericanOil Co., 609 F.2d 873 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 918 (1980); Lehrman
v. Gulf Oil Co., 500 F.2d 659,667 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 929 (1975).
14Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. , 110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
65 See supra Report, note 2, at 20.
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The situation is different if the wholesale purchaser absorbs the entire
monopoly price increase. In that instance, the retail price remains at a
competitive level. Presumably, the retail demand at the competitive price
is met and there is no consumer deadweight loss. On the other hand, in
some but not all of the cases where the monopoly price is passed through,
there will be some consumer deadweight loss that under the present law
would not be recovered in a suit by a direct purchaser.
Figure 3 is similar to Figure 2, with the addition of a third party, a
jobber, in the distribution chain. Again, the monopoly price is imposed
by the producer. Only the jobber, as the direct purchaser, can recover for
lost profits. Since the deadweight loss to the jobber and the wholesale
purchaser are both subsumed within a lost profits recovery, there should
be no separate deadweight loss for the wholesale purchaser's loss. How-
ever, as Figure 2 indicates, the deadweight loss at the consumer level
remains and should be recoverable.
Figure 3
Retail Monopoly Prce
Retail Competve Pice
Wholesale Monopoly Prie
Wholesale Competitive Price
Producer Monopoly Prime
________Producer Compoetitlee Pnice
Jobber Wholesale Retail
Demand Demand Demand
IV. WHO SHOULD BE PERMITTED To RECOVER DAMAGES
FOR CONSUMER WELFARE Loss?
In identifying the appropriate parties to recover damages for consumer
deadweight loss, the easiest example involves a suit by consumers. For
instance, in a consumer class action against a price fixer or monopolist,
it would be entirely appropriate for the class to include those who would
have purchased, but did not because of the higher than competitive cost. 6
5 See Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 31. "The immediate burden of the tradi-
tional social cost of monopoly is borne by consumers who would have purchased
the product at a competitive price, but who refuse to buy at the monopoly price.
The efficiency loss results from the fact that these consumers must make a sub-
stitute choice that gives them a lower consumer surplus than the surplus they
would have enjoyed had the market been competitive." Id.
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The measure of damages to those would-be buyers is their loss of consumer
welfare. If the loss of consumer welfare is not recoverable, the collusive
firms are not being charged for the true cost of their illegal behavior and
the purpose of antitrust damages are frustrated.57
The more difficult problem arises when the consumer is an indirect
purchaser. The U.S. Supreme Court, while not yet forbidding all antitrust
claims by indirect purchasers, has placed strict and narrow limits on
indirect purchaser claims. 6 In Illinois Brick v. State of Illinois,59 the Court
held that an indirect purchaser is not injured within the meaning of
Section 4 of the Clayton Act.60 This same holding, was reiterated in Kan-
sas and Missouri v. Utilicorp United, Inc."t
However, none of the rationale given by the Court in these two cases
supports the conclusion that an indirect purchaser is not an injured party.
Significantly, neither case involved a claim for damages for deadweight
loss. A more reasonable conclusion would have been that indirect pur-
chasers are too remote from the injury to be permitted to recover.6 2 If, in
fact, indirect purchasers have not suffered an antitrust injury under Sec-
tion 4, it makes no sense to say that in some instances an indirect pur-
chaser may sue. However, the Court seems to be saying just that. Thus,
in Kansas and Missouri, the Court said "we might allow indirect pur-
chasers to sue only when, by hypothesis, the direct purchaser will bear
no portion of the overcharge and otherwise suffer no injury."
In Illinois Brick, the state of Illinois sued to recover the increased costs
it incurred when it purchased buildings built, in part, of concrete blocks,
the price of which had been fixed by a conspiracy of block manufacturers.
The concrete blocks passed through several hands before being purchased
as part of the buildings. The Court denied the state the right to recover
for three reasons. First, there was a possibility of duplicative recoveries
if both direct and indirect purchasers could sue. Second, the Court em-
phasized the uncertainty and difficulty inherent in any attempt to ap-
portion the damages between direct and indirect purchasers. Third, the
Court was concerned that permitting various levels of direct and indirect
purchasers to recover damages would dilute the potential recovery of each
plaintiff to such a low level that there would be little incentive for private
enforcement of the antitrust laws.
None of the three rationale given in Illinois Brick are applicable to
indirect purchaser suits for loss of consumer surplus. Unless direct pur-
chasers are to be given the right to recover -for consumer surplus loss,
57 Havens, supra note 5, at 465.
DAvm C. HJELMFELT, ANTITRUST AND REGULATED INDUSTRIES 168-69 (1985).
59 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
60 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988).
61 Supra note 54.
612 Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpen-
ters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983) (applying a proximate cause test in part to determine
antitrust standing).
110 S. Ct. at 2818. See also, California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93
(1989).
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there is no problem of duplicate recoveries. Regardless, the normal meas-
ure of damages recoverable by a direct purchaser does not include dead-
weight loss. Similarly, there should be no problem with apportioning
damages because while the amount of consumer deadweight loss might
change depending upon flow through of the overcharge, the deadweight
loss remains an easily identifiable, if not easily calculated, amount. There
is no concern with dilution of damages because permitting indirect con-
sumers to recover for deadweight loss would not reduce the amount of
damages recoverable by the direct purchaser.
Accordingly, the Illinois Brick doctrine should not be extended to pre-
clude indirect suits by consumers for deadweight loss. This does not nec-
essarily mean that consumers, as indirect purchasers, should be allowed
to recover deadweight loss. There are a number of reasons for preferring
recovery for deadweight loss by the direct purchaser. For example, it may
be difficult to identify the would-be consumers. This is particularly true
for supposed customer-plaintiffs who had no prior history of purchases
before the overcharge. Moreover, for many of these would-be consumers,
the amount in issue will be too small to merit the expense of an antitrust
suit. Also, such would-be consumers are probably in the weakest position
to detect an antitrust violation. For these reasons, the direct purchaser,
rather than the would-be consumer, is the preferable choice to recover
damages for consumer deadweight loss.64 Additionally, it is more efficient
to permit the direct purchaser to recover for all losses caused by the
violation.
65
States are another class of potential plaintiffs for the recovery of con-
sumer deadweight loss damages. States may sue under the antitrust laws
for injuries to the state's economy.6 However, the general right of a state
to sue for injury to its economy has been limited to suits for injunctive
relief.6 7 Since the threatened antitrust injury giving cause for injunctive
relief would almost certainly cause additional injuries, adding a claim
based on consumer deadweight loss would be of only marginal benefit,
and would add unnecessary burdens. Additionally, Section 4c of the Clay-
ton Act 6 8 does provide specifically for parens patriae actions by states for
antitrust injuries to natural persons. However, the statute was not in-
tended to remove the prohibition on recovering damages for injury to the
state's general economy.689 Moreover, under Section 4c, states cannot sue
to recover damages incurred by indirect purchasers.7 0 Section 4c does not
establish any new substantive rights. Rather, it simply "created a new
Supra note 62.
Page, supra note 29, at 1271.
Georgia v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
617 Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970).
15 U.S.C. § 15c (1988).
However, at least one commentator argues that Section 4c was passed as a
legislative response to cases like Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th
Cir. 1970), which disallowed parens patriae suits for damages to the state's econ-
omy. JULIANE 0. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 101.11 (1969).
7Supra note 54.
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procedural device ... to enforce existing rights of recovery under § 4.' '71
Accordingly, it is unlikely that states will emerge as the proper parties
to assert claims for deadweight losses.
One objection that may be raised in suits by direct purchasers for
deadweight loss incurred by indirect purchasers is that this is not an
injury sustained by the direct purchaser. This criticism is, of course, true.
However, in opting for suits by direct purchasers rather than indirect
purchasers, even in cases where all or almost all of the overcharge was
passed on to indirect purchasers, the Supreme Court has already approved
recovery by direct purchasers of damages not incurred by them.72 The
ruling in Illinois Brick has played havoc with the language of Section
4.73 There is no justification for holding that direct purchasers may recover
for some damages sustained only by the indirect purchasers, but not other
damages.
V. CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING
One of the objections raised to allowing a direct purchaser to recover
for the deadweight loss to the ultimate consumer is the lack of consti-
tutional standing.74 However, constitutional standing to bring an action
is much more expansive than is the concept of antitrust standing. The
Supreme Court observed in Associated General Contractors v. California
State Council of Carpenters that "[h]arm to the antitrust plaintiff is suf-
ficient to satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury on fact,
but the court must make a further determination whether the plaintiff
is a proper party to bring a private antitrust action."75 Given that the
Supreme Court has already determined in Illinois Brick76 that the direct
purchaser is the injured party, it would be improper to then say the direct
purchaser lacks constitutional standing to maintain the action. 77
Moreover, following the logic of Illinois Brick, the direct purchaser
should also satisfy the three requirements for constitutional standing of
(1) personal injury; (2) fairly traceable to the defendant's allegedly un-
lawful conduct; and (3) likely to be redressed by the requested relief.78
Under Illinois Brick, the direct purchaser has suffered the personal injury
even for passed-on damages. The injury is clearly traceable to the de-
71 Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 734 n.14.
11 Id. at 746.7
1 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Indirect-Purchaser Rule and Cost-Plus Sales, 103
HARV. L. REV. 1717, 1725-26 (1990).
74 See City of Vernon v. Southern Cali. Edison Co., No. 83-8137 (C.D. Cal. May
23, 1989).
76 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31.
76 431 U.S. 720.
77 Accord Southern Pacific Co. v. Darnell-Taenzer Lumber Co., 245 U.S. 531(1918); Adams v. Mills, 286 U.S. 397 (1932); Bacchus Imports v. Dias, 468 U.S.
263 (1984); County of Oakland v. City of Detroit, 866 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1989).
11 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); American West Airlines, Inc. v.
Burnley, 838 F.2d 1343 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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fendant's unlawful conduct and is likely to be redressed by an award of
damages. Therefore, the direct purchaser has constitutional standing to
recover deadweight loss.
VI. RECOVERY OF DAMAGES FOR CONSUMER WELFARE LOSS IN
STATE COURT PROCEEDINGS
In California v. ARC America Corp., 9 the Supreme Court held that the
rule of Illinois Brick does not preempt state statutes permitting indirect
purchasers to sue under state law for antitrust damages. A number of
states have specific statutory provisions permitting suits by indirect pur-
chasers.80
Many of these state statutes specifically prohibit the award of dupli-
cative damages. Where a state statute permits suits by indirect pur-
chasers as well as direct purchasers, the indirect purchaser should be
permitted to recover deadweight loss damages. The argument in favor of
permitting the indirect purchaser to recover deadweight loss damages is
marginally stronger in those states which expressly prohibit duplicative
damages. However, in any event, there are sufficient procedural devices
such as interpleader, joinder of necessary parties, and case consolidation,
already in place which empower state courts to avoid awards of dupli-
cative damages."' Moreover, in a case predating Illinois Brick, the Ninth
Circuit found no insurmountable problem in apportioning damages:
Problems of the apportionment of damages as between an in-
termediary and an ultimate consumer may be treated after
liability is established, unless it is clear that no ultimate con-
sumer was damaged. If an intermediary is shown to have been
damaged by payment of an illegal overcharge which was not
passed on to the ultimate consumer, [defendant's] liability to
ultimate consumers, to that extent, may be decreased. 2
The deadweight loss portion of damages need not be apportioned, but
could be assigned directly to the indirect purchasers. Another alternative
would be to permit the direct purchaser to recover deadweight loss dam-
7 490 U.S. 93 (1989).
See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1990) § 16750(a); D. C. CODE, ANN.,
§ 28-4509 (1990); HAW. REV. STAT., § 480-13 (1990); ILL. ANTITRUST ACT § 7(2)
(1990); ME. REV. STAT. ANN., Title 10, § 1104 (West 1990); MD. COM. LAW I CODE
ANN., § 11-209 (1990) (limited to suits by the United States, Maryland, or any
political subdivision); Mich. Antitrust Reform Act, Section 8 (1990); Minn. An-
titrust Law of 1971, Section 325D.57; MIss. CODE ANN., § 75-21-9 (1972); N.D.
CENT. CODE, § 51-08.1-08 (1990).
"I In Re Western Liquid Asphalt Cases, 487 F.2d 191 (9th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 919 (1974).
82 Id. at 200.
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ages on behalf of the indirect purchasers in the nature of a class action
suit tacked on to the main suit. Surely, the American legal system is
sufficiently adaptable to fashion a remedy for the deadweight loss harm
to society.
VII. CONCLUSION
Economists argue that consumer deadweight loss is an injury to society
from anticompetitive overcharges reflecting underproduction and mis-
allocation of resources. Although this element of damages is not currently
being recovered by antitrust plaintiffs, it is a calculable amount that
should be sought in overcharge cases. Permitting recovery of damages
for consumer deadweight loss is consistent with Congress' intent in en-
acting Section 4 of the Clayton Act where it sought to ensure that victims
of anticompetitive conduct receive compensation. 3 Direct purchasers are
the best situated plaintiffs to prosecute claims for damages for deadweight
loss to consumers.
13 Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
[Vol. 39:505
16https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol39/iss4/4
